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Abstract
While Myanmar moved to a floating exchange rate regime from a fixed exchange rate regime in April 2012, parallel 
market transactions of foreign exchange remained pervasive. This paper investigates the question whether the reforms
have established a transmission channel of exchange rates from the formal to parallel markets. The empirical results of 
VAR analysis with the daily exchange rates indicate that the Central Bank has been following the parallel rate rather than 
guiding it, implying that a transmission channel is yet to be established.
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1. Introduction
Myanmar (Burma) used to have a multiple exchange rate system. The disparity between the official
exchange rate and a prevalent parallel market rate once reached 24200% in September 2007, where the
official and parallel exchange rates of the Myanmar kyat vis-à-vis the US dollar were 5.6303 and 1,369, 
respectively. The new government, which came to office in March 2011, abolished pegging the kyat and 
moved to a managed float regime in April 2012. At the same time, the Central Bank of Myanmar initiated the
daily price tender auction of foreign exchange with commercial banks, and announcing the cut-off rate of the
auction to the public as the reference rate. The reforms, however, do not necessarily mean the end of the
multiple exchange rate system.
A unified foreign exchange market is where the prices of foreign exchange in various parts of the market are
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converged. Usually, in a unified market, commercial banks hold the key position; commercial banks trade 
foreign exchange with exporters and importers as well as with each other and with the central bank. Arbitrage 
activities of commercial banks provide a transmission channel for the central bank to control market exchange 
rates; the central bank can influence the exchange rates of the retail market through transactions with 
commercial banks. 
Market segmentation with separate exchange rates arises when the government regulates the uses and 
sources of foreign exchange (Canales-Kriljenko, 2004: 9). For example, as for the uses of foreign exchange, 
when the government prohibits domestic residents’ portfolio investments in foreign assets, there can emerge 
an illicit segment of the foreign exchange market for portfolio investments. Due to the pervasive regulations 
in the past, the parallel foreign exchange market has developed in Myanmar. Even after the move to the 
managed float system, the bulk of foreign exchange transactions still take place outside the formal banking 
system. Accordingly, we examine if transmission channels of exchange rate from the formal to parallel 
markets have been established. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We compare the structure of the foreign exchange 
market before and after the reforms. We describe the foreign exchange market segmentation before the 
reforms in Section 2, and we review the reforms taken by the new government in Section 3. To evaluate if 
transmission channels for foreign exchange policy have been established or not, we examine the relationship 
between the formal and parallel exchange rates by a vector autoregression (VAR) model in Section 4. We 
present concluding remarks in Section 5. 
2. Myanmar’s Foreign Exchange Market before Reforms 
In this section, we describe the foreign exchange market segmentation in Myanmar before the reforms of 
the new government inaugurated in March 2011.2 Myanmar’s foreign exchange market was segmented in two 
ways: between the private and public sectors, and within the private sector. 
2.1. Segmentation between the private and public sectors 
As documented in World Bank (1995: 18), Hori and Wong (2008) and IMF (2012), the foreign exchange 
market was segmented between the private and public sectors. The official exchange rate was applied only for 
the transactions in the public sector. The official exchange rate was pegged at 8.50847 kyat per the special 
drawing right (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1977, and did not change for over 30 years 
until April 2012. On the other hand, the kyat has depreciated consistently in the parallel market. 
In the private sector, there has been, in principle, no allocation of foreign exchange from the government at 
the official exchange rate, nor surrender requirement on export revenues since 1990.3 While there was an 
explicit export tax, private exporters had been permitted to retain 100 percent of their export earnings (after 
deducting export taxes).4 As foreign exchange regulations did not allow Myanmar residents to hold foreign 
banknotes, exporters had to maintain their export earnings in the form of foreign currency deposits (FCDs) at 
Myanmar state banks. 
 
 
2 Myat Thein (2004) offers the general description of the Myanmar economy before the recent reforms. 
3 Before 1989, foreign trade of the private sector was prohibited. In 1989, the government legalized private sector foreign trade. Initially, 
there was surrender requirement that private exporters had to sell 40% of their export revenue at the official exchange rate. But the 
government abolished this surrender requirement in 1990, and instead introduced an explicit export tax. The tax comprised an 8% of sales 
tax and a 2% of income tax payable in foreign currency.   
4 According to Ida (2005: 237-238), there were two exceptional cases: one is that in 2001 garment exporters were required to surrender 
export revenues at the government-directed exchange rate for an amount equivalent to their employment costs. The other is that prawn 
exporters were required to surrender a portion of their export revenues at the government-directed rate in August 2000. 
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As for the disposition of FCDs, domestic account transfers between private exporters and importers were 
tolerated by the government, which provided the foundation for the parallel market. For exporters, selling 
FCDs to importers through domestic account transfers enabled them to convert FCDs to the kyat. Using 
domestic account transfer, sellers and buyers negotiated a competitive exchange rate. 
Another way to dispose of FCDs was withdrawal in foreign exchange certificate (FEC). The government 
introduced FECs in February 1993, and one FEC was equivalent to one US dollar at face value. In December 
1995, the government established an authorised FEC exchange centre where money changers traded FECs at 
competitive exchange rates. This was an initial attempt to overhaul the foreign exchange system, and the 
government virtually recognized competitive exchange rates. However, faced with the sharp depreciation of 
the kyat, the government ordered the exchange centre to fix the price at 450 kyat per FEC in July 2001, after 
which transactions at the centre stopped. FECs were later traded in the parallel market, usually at a discount 
compared to the price of US dollar banknotes due to restrictions on its usage, so that FCDs were seldom 
withdrawn in FECs.  
Turning to the public sector, foreign exchange transactions were centrally controlled by the government 
and were conducted at the official exchange rate. Exporting state economic enterprises (SEEs) had to 
surrender all of their export revenues to the state budget at the official exchange rate. Imports had to be 
authorised by the state budget for a foreign exchange ration at the official exchange rate. Foreign exchange 
was mainly rationed out to imports of fuel oil, military equipment, and to a lesser extent, industrial goods. 
Since the allocation of foreign exchange was determined by the central government, individual SEEs had 
no autonomy in the disposition of foreign exchange. The local currency budget and the foreign currency 
budget were completely separate, so that SEEs were not entitled to convert the kyat budget to the foreign 
currency budget. Based on their survey of the parallel foreign exchange markets in developing countries, 
Kiguel and O’Connell (1995) contend that as the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates gets 
wider, the tighter restriction it requires to maintain the multiple exchange rate system. Accordingly, the role of 
the official exchange rate as a price signal in resource allocation would diminish. For the case of Myanmar, 
the central government control governed the allocation of foreign exchange within the public sector. The strict 
rationing of foreign exchange implies that the official exchange rate did not act as a price signal even within 
the public sector. 
2.2. Segmentation within the private sector 
The government imposed various administrative controls on foreign trade in the private sector, which 
resulted in further market segmentation. The most significant control was the ‘export first and import second’ 
policy. To begin with, all imports and exports in the private sector were subject to licensing by the 
government. On top of that, since July 1997, the government conditioned import licences to be issued only if 
import applicants had sufficient export-tax-deducted export earnings to cover the import bill. This policy was 
aimed at containing the rising current account deficits. Prior to the introduction of the ‘export first’ policy, 
import licences were obtainable not only with export earnings but also with FECs. After this policy change, 
for an applicant without export earnings, the government restricted the amount of import licence to 
US$50,000 per person per month. This ceiling was reduced progressively to US$30,000 in January 1999 and 
to US$10,000 in August 2000. Imports without export earnings became virtually impossible thereafter (Kudo 
and Mieno, 2009: 108). Subsequently, the usage of FECs was restricted to domestic ones such as for the 
purchase of gasoline in excess of quotas and the payments of utility bills for foreign companies. 
The controls and regulations segmented the foreign exchange market into several parts. One segment was 
the market for export-earning FCDs with proof of export tax payment. Another was the one for illicitly held 
US dollar banknotes, which could not be used for imports through normal channels, but could be used for 
smuggling imports. Since export-tax-deducted export earnings were eligible for import licences, they were 
often traded with some degree of mark-up above illicitly held US dollar banknotes. However, export earnings 
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were sometimes illiquid assets since they could be disposed of only either by domestic account transfers to 
importers or withdrawal in FECs. There was also another market segment for FECs. Due to restrictive usage, 
FECs were usually traded at a discount compared to illicitly held US dollar banknotes.  
The gaps among the prices of various forms of foreign exchange are evidence of market segmentation. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trends of three parallel market exchange rates, namely US dollar banknotes, export- 
earning FCDs, and FECs. For the period from August 2007 through March 2012, the average premium of 
FCDs over US dollar banknotes was 2.76%. The premium once reached 13.60% in January 2010. However, 
the premium fluctuated, and it fell to -8.56% in January 2009. On the other hand, the average discount on 
FECs against US dollar banknotes was 4.44%. The discount rate rose to 25.32% in August 2008, when the 
circulation of FECs jumped due to the remittances of official aid for natural disaster relief.5 This figure shows 
clearly that the regulations resulted in market segmentation within the parallel market. 
 
 
 Source: Japan External Trade Organization, Yangon Office. 
Fig. 1. Trends of Daily Exchange Rates, 15 August 15, 2007—30 March, 2012. 
A remarkable characteristic of the parallel market was that the banking sector was not involved in price 
formation of exchange rate. Although private exporters deposited formal export earnings as FCDs at state 
banks, these banks did not usually buy or sell foreign exchange with the private sector. As shown in Figure 2, 
exporters and importers themselves negotiated the price of FCDs. In such a transaction, the state banks only 
processed domestic account transfers. The payment flow in the kyat from the importer to the exporter took 
place outside the state banks. 
 
 
 
5 Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in May 2008 resulting in at least 138,000 fatalities. While the international community including United 
Nations’ agencies, offered disaster relief assistance, foreign exchange regulations required their remittances to Myanmar be withdrawn 
only in FECs, which brought in a hike in the circulation of FECs and exacerbated the discount on FECs. 
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Source: Author
Fig. 2. Structure of the Parallel Market in the Private Sector
State banks did not provide foreign currency loans. While they issued letters of credit (L/Cs) for imports,
they required importers to produce sufficient FCDs to cover the full amount of L/Cs. As a result, in the 
balance sheet of the state banks, foreign currency liabilities of FCDs were matched with foreign currency
liquidity. The state banks used to have a limited capacity of foreign exchange management.
3. Reforms by the New Government
The new government implemented foreign exchange policy reforms in rapid succession. In October 2011,
the Central Bank authorised six private banks to run the foreign exchange counters in one location where
retail customers could sell and buy foreign currency with these banks. However, there were some caveats on
the foreign exchange counters. From the consideration on anti-money laundering, the central bank imposed
limits on the amount of foreign exchange that a customer could buy and sell at the counters; above the limits,
a customer had to produce a document proving the source of foreign exchange in the case of selling foreign
exchange or the intended use in the case of buying foreign exchange.6 On top of these, since transactions at 
the foreign exchange counters involve cash in the US dollar and the kyat, transaction amounts were inevitably
constrained by the availability of cash of the counters. Thus, transactions at the foreign exchange counters
were small.
In April 2012, the Central Bank abolished the peg of the kyat to the SDR and moved to a managed float
exchange rate regime; it began the daily auction of foreign exchange with authorised dealer banks, and 
announcing the cut-off rate of the price tender auction as the daily reference exchange rate to the public. Prior 
to this, the Central Bank issued foreign exchange dealer licences to 11 private banks in November 2011. The
reference exchange rate is used to explicitly guide the selling and buying rates of the banks. At the authorised 
foreign exchange counters, the selling and buying rates have to be within ± 0.8% of the reference rate.
Authorised dealer banks are also permitted to trade foreign currency with depositors at the rates within ± 0.3%
of the reference rate.
6 The limits and the document requirements have been changed from time to time.
State Banks
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Account
transfer of 
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Another important development in July 2012 was that private banks started to accept FCDs and to offer 
international banking services such as remittances and settlements of foreign trade. Previously, international 
banking operations were monopolized by the state banks. This policy change is expected to facilitate foreign 
trade in the private sector. 
As to foreign trade regulations, there have been substantial reforms as well. Import restrictions have been 
alleviated stepwise. The import restriction on the passenger vehicles, which were most strictly controlled 
commodities in the previous era, was deregulated in September 2011 onward, and import licences were 
increased substantially. The average growth rate in the registered passenger vehicles was 7.3% per annum for 
2006-2009, and it rose to 13.9% in 20127. Furthermore, the ‘export-first’ policy was abolished in April 2012. 
Since then, import licences have been obtainable with non-export earnings raised at the foreign exchange 
counters or with illicitly held US dollar banknotes by depositing them at FCD accounts. 
We expect the abolition of the ‘export first’ policy to cut the premium on export-earning FCDs against US 
dollar banknotes. Figure 3 depicts the Central Bank reference rate and parallel market rates. This figure 
confirms that there was a premium of 7% on the exchange rate of FCDs relative to US dollar banknotes in late 
April 2012, and the premium diminished to 0% in mid May 2012. 
 
 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization, Yangon Office 
Fig. 3. Trends of Daily Exchange Rates, 2 April, 2012—13 March, 2013. 
However, the unification of the segmented foreign exchange market is not complete in several dimensions. 
First, the segmentation between the private and public sectors is intact. The public sector is still under the 
system of the foreign exchange budget as before; SEEs surrender export revenues to the state budget, and 
importing SEEs receive foreign exchange allocation from the state budget. In terms of imports, the state sector 
accounted for 26.8 percent of the total imports of the country in fiscal year 2011. Its reform entails the 
restructuring of the entire state budget system. 
 
 
7 These figures are from the Selected Monthly Economic Indicators of the Central Statistical Organization, Myanmar. 
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Second, the bulk of foreign exchange transactions in the private sector take place in the parallel market; 
exporters and importers continue trading FCDs outside the banking system at negotiated prices. In Figure 3, 
the gap between the Central Bank reference rate and the informal broker selling rate of US dollar banknotes 
has been mostly less than 2%. However, the small gap does not necessarily mean the integration of the 
Central Bank with the parallel market. It could be the case that the Central Bank chose the reference rate 
following the parallel market rates. 
The prevalence of parallel market transactions raises the concern whether transmission channels for 
exchange rate policy have been established or not. If there were no transmission channel, the Central Bank 
would not be able to stabilize the parallel market exchange rates. Furthermore, as the kyat has appreciated 
considerably against Myanmar’s trade partner countries in recent years (IMF, 2012; Kubo, 2012), the need for 
exchange rate policy is increasing. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
To investigate the question if there is a transmission channel of exchange rate from the formal to parallel 
markets, we examine the relationship between the Central Bank reference rate and the informal broker selling 
price of US dollar banknote in the parallel market. The sample period of daily exchange rates spans from 2 
April 2012 through 13 March 2013. The Central Bank announces the reference rate every day except Saturday, 
Sunday and holidays. The total number of observations is 231. We use variables in logarithm, and denote the 
Central Bank reference rate and the parallel market rate as lnCBM and lnBKN, respectively. 
First, we examine stationarity of the two time series with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The test 
statistics indicate that both lnCBM and lnBKN are non-stationary in their levels but stationary in their first 
difference at the 1% significance level. Thus, we judge they are I(1) variables. Second, we test if two 
variables are co-integrated in their levels. The Maximum Eigenvalue test indicates that the null hypothesis of 
no co-integration cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level.8 
Accordingly, we estimate a bi-variate vector autoregression (VAR) model as below; 
 
ο݈݊ܥܤܯ௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ܣଵଵሺܮሻο݈݊ܥܤܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ܣଵଶሺܮሻο݈݊ܤܭ ௧ܰିଵ ൅ ߝଵ௧ ,                 (1) 
ο݈݊ܤܭ ௧ܰ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ܣଶଵሺܮሻο݈݊ܥܤܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ܣଶଶሺܮሻο݈݊ܤܭ ௧ܰିଵ ൅ ߝଶ௧,                (2) 
 
where ܣ௜௝ is the polynomials in the lag operator L. ߝଵ௧ and ߝଶ௧ are independently distributed disturbance terms. 
We test the null hypothesis that ܣଶଵሺܮሻ ൌ Ͳ. The rejection of this null hypothesis indicates that the Central 
Bank reference rate would Granger-cause the parallel exchange rate, implying that the Central Bank could 
exert influences on the parallel market exchange rate. As to the empirical model, the lag length is pared down 
to 10 from 20 by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Regarding the specification of VAR(10), the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation of residuals up to the lag order of 20 cannot be rejected at least at the 3% 
significance level by the Lagrange multiplier tests. 
We summarise the results of the Granger causality tests in Table 1. The null hypothesis that οlnCBM does 
not Granger-cause οlnBKN cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. On the other hand, the null 
hypothesis that οlnBKN does not Granger-cause οlnCBM can be rejected at the 1% significance level. These 
results imply that the Central Bank has been following the parallel exchange rate rather than guiding it. 
 
 
 
8 For evaluation of co-integration relationship, we include 20 lags of οlnCBM and οlnBKN, where ο refers to first difference. 
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                         Table 1. Granger Causality between Central Bank Reference Rate and US Dollar Banknotes Rate 
Null Hypothesis οlnCBM does not Granger-
causes οlnBKN 
οlnBKN does not Granger-
causes οlnCBM 
Test Statistics (ɖଶሺͳͲሻሻ 15.54956 60.62756 
Probability that null hypothesis holds 0.1133 0.0000 
       Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
We further examine the relationship between the Central Bank reference rate and another parallel rate, 
which is the price of export-earning FCDs. Due to missing values of the FCD exchange rate, the sample 
period is from 2 July 2012. We denote the logarithm of FCD exchange rate as lnFCD. We estimate two bi-
variate VAR(10) models, namely one with  ο݈݊ܥܤܯ and ο݈݊ܨܥܦ, and the other with  ο݈݊ܨܥܦ and ο݈݊ܤܭܰ. 
We summarise the results of Granger causality tests in Table 2. The null hypothesis that ο݈݊ܥܤܯ does not 
Granger-cause ο݈݊ܨܥܦ cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level, whereas the one that ο݈݊ܨܥܦ does 
not Granger-cause ο݈݊ܥܤܯ can be rejected at the 10% significance level. These results are consistent with 
the conjecture that the Central Bank has been following the parallel exchange rates rather than guiding them. 
On the other hand, the ο݈݊ܨܥܦ  Granger-causes ο݈݊ܤܭܰ  and vice-versa, which implies that segmentation 
within the parallel market has been resolved at least partially. 
       Table 2. Granger Causality among Central Bank Reference Rate, Foreign Currency Deposits Rate, and US Dollar Banknotes Rate 
Null Hypothesis οlnCBM does not  
Granger-causes 
 οlnFCD 
οlnFCD does not  
Granger-causes  
οlnCBM 
οlnFCD does not  
Granger-causes  
οlnBKN 
οlnBKN does not  
Granger-causes  
οlnFCD 
Test Statistics (ɖଶሺͳͲሻሻ 15.51977 16.46030 21.50312 21.74250 
Probability that null hypothesis holds 0.1142 0.0872 0.0178 0.0165 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to identify bottlenecks in the transmission channels from the 
formal to parallel markets. One possibility is that the size of the Central Bank auction of foreign exchange 
may be too small to exert influences on the parallel market rates. Alternatively, there might be some hidden 
costs for private exporters and importers to transact foreign exchange with the authorised dealer banks, which 
may drive them to parallel market transactions. Further studies are necessary to identify the obstacles of the 
transmission channels. 
5. Conclusion 
Since its inauguration in March 2011, the new government has started the long-sought overhaul of the 
foreign exchange system in Myanmar. Prior to the reforms, all foreign exchange transactions of the private 
sector were in the parallel market since the fixed official exchange rate was applied only to transactions in the 
public sector. In April 2012, the new government abolished the pegging of the official rate and moved to a 
managed float exchange rate system; the Central Bank initiated daily auction of foreign exchange with 
commercial banks, announcing the cut-off rate of the price tender auction as the reference rate to the public. 
Despite the reforms, parallel market transactions of foreign exchange remained pervasive. We questioned if 
the reforms have established a transmission channel from the Central Bank reference rate to parallel rates. 
The VAR analyses with daily exchange rates show that the Central Bank reference rate does not Granger-
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cause parallel exchange rates, whereas parallel exchange rates Granger-cause the Central Bank reference rate. 
These empirical results do not confirm that the transmission channels have been established. Although the 
gaps between the Central Bank reference rate and the parallel rates have been mostly less than 2%, the 
empirical results imply that the Central Bank has been following the parallel exchange rates rather than 
guiding them. 
As Myanmar deepens its integration in the world economy, it will be exposed to more volatile capital flows 
including foreign direct investments and official aid flows, so that there will be more needs for exchange rate 
policy to stabilize exchange rates. It is an urgent task for the Central Bank to establish a transmission channel 
for exchange rate policy. Further studies are necessary to identify bottlenecks in transmission channels. 
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